[2], The first concrete assurances by Western leaders on NATO began on January 31, 1990, when West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher opened the bidding with a major public speech at Tutzing, in Bavaria, on German unification. Im Volk nannte man sie auch »Prichwatisazija« – räuberische Aneignung. September 1990: Die Zwei-plus-Vier-Verhandlungen sind abgeschlossen, DDR-Ministerpräsident de Maiziére (l) und Bundesaußenminister Hans-Dietrich Genscher unterzeichnen den Vertrag für die beiden deutschen Staaten. Falin puts it in blunt terms: while Soviet European policy has fallen into inactivity and even “depression” after the March 18 elections in East Germany, and Gorbachev himself has let Kohl speed up the process of unification, his compromises on Germany in NATO can only lead to the slipping away of his main goal for Europe – the common European home. (18.03.2010). Er fügt hinzu: "Goebbels verstand auch etwas von PR.". Repeating what Bush said at the Malta summit in December 1989, Baker tells Gorbachev: “The President and I have made clear that we seek no unilateral advantage in this process” of inevitable German unification. Der letzte KPdSU-Generalsekretär Michail Gorbatschow erreichte Ende 1990 nur noch Zustimmungsraten um 20 Prozent. In den Geschichtsbüchern steht sein Name neben Gorbatschow. The Last Superpower Summits Wie steht es heute um das historisches Ansehen des letzten Generalsekretärs der KPdSU und des ersten und einzigen Präsidenten der Sowjetunion? [10] See Andrei Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008), pp. Kohl talks repeatedly about the new era of relations between a united Germany and the Soviet Union, and how this relationship would contribute to European stability and security. Charakteristisch und wegweisend für Russland: Keiner der Kandidaten kam aus den Reihen liberaler Dissidenten. Below - wie Viele im heutigen Russland - werfen Gorbatschow vor, naiv gehandelt zu haben. He leads a clean but tough game. Auch durch seine Suchtkrankheit wurde der zunächst populäre Politiker in den Augen vieler Russen zu einer peinlichen Figur. The total amount West Germany ultimately paid to the Kremlin for reunification is unknown, although it's usually estimated at between 50 and 80 billion marks (25-40 billion euros or $31-50 billion). Fest steht: Die Sowjetunion mischt sich nicht ein. Because, if it grew out of NATO, it would have to be named something else, if only because of the element of prestige. “Summing up the past six months, one has to conclude that the ‘common European home,’ which used to be a concrete task the countries of the continent were starting to implement, is now turning into a mirage.” While the West is sweet-talking Gorbachev into accepting German unification in NATO, Falin notes (correctly) that “the Western states are already violating the consensus principle by making preliminary agreements among themselves” regarding German unification and the future of Europe that do not include a “long phase of constructive development.” He notes the West’s “intensive cultivation of not only NATO but also our Warsaw Pact allies” with the goal to isolate the USSR in the Two-Plus-Four and CSCE framework. January 23, 2017, The Shevardnadze File: Late Soviet Foreign Minister Helped End the Cold War Juli 1990 im Kaukasus ebnete den Weg zur Deutschen Einheit. "Es war die Zeit der Aufbruchstimmung zwischen Russland und Deutschland," sagt Professor Wirsching. Dezember 1991 in einer Vereinbarung mit den Staatschefs der Ukraine und von Belarus, zu Weihnachten war das rote Riesenreich am Ende. Mit 30 Jahren wurde er 1961 Mitglied der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion (KPdSU). Kohl habe „eine . This is not just bluffing. It is a wonderful dream, but just a dream. Schon bei der Wahl im Juni 1991 hatte Jelzin im Gebiet Swerdlowsk, wo er einst KP-Chef war, verdächtige 84,8 Prozent eingesammelt. At the same time he was hoping to get at least partial political compensation from his Western partners for what he believed to be his major contribution to the end of the Cold War.”[10]. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz included these memcons in his report to the NSC and the State Department about his attendance at a conference in Prague on “The Future of European Security,” on April 24-27, 1991. 1990 warf er Gorbatschow im französischen Fernsehen vor, er schwelge in »Zarenreichtum« mit »vier Datschen«, gebaut »vom Geld des Volkes«. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons ((https://bush41library.tamu.edu/). Mehr und mehr flüchtete Jelzin sich in den Alkohol und war bei öffentlichen Auftritten oft mit schwerer Zunge zu hören. Ein Rückblick. 40, No. Instead, the dissolution of the USSR was brought about by Russians (Boris Yeltsin and his leading advisory Gennady Burbulis) in concert with the former party bosses of the Soviet republics, especially Ukraine, in December 1991. Both leaders express the need for the closest cooperation between them in order to reach the desired outcome. In den Zwei-plus-Vier-Verhandlungen geht es vor allem darum, die Sowjetunion in diesem Punkt zu überzeugen. Juli 1990 ist die Treuhand zur Eigentümerin von 8.000 Kombinaten und Betrieben geworden. Merkel hat sich in Russland spätestens seit Beginn der Ukraine-Krise unbeliebt gemacht. The U.S. State Department’s subsequent view of the German unification negotiations, expressed in a 1996 cable sent to all posts, mistakenly asserts that the entire negotiation over the future of Germany limited its discussion of the future of NATO to the specific arrangements over the territory of the former GDR. In this famous “two anchor” discussion, the U.S. and Soviet delegations deliberate over the process of German unification and especially the issue of a united Germany joining NATO. Juli 1990 in Moskau stattfindet. Nicht erst der Ukraine-Krieg hat dem ein radikales Ende gesetzt. Jelzins Aufstieg leitete das Ende der Sowjetunion ein. "Ich halte ihn nicht für einen Liberalen", sagt Kohl über Gorbatschow, sondern für einen "modernen kommunistischen Führer", der "was von PR" verstehe. Dass Jelzin sich fast ein Jahrzehnt an der Macht halten konnte, auch mit Krediten aus dem Westen, verdankte er weniger seinen Wählern als Politikern im Westen. First official round of the Two Plus Four negotiations, with the six foreign ministers, in Bonn on May 5, 1990. I correctly understand the security interests of the Soviet Union, and I realize that you, Mr. General Secretary, and the Soviet leadership will have to clearly explain what is happening to the Soviet people.” Later the two leaders tussle about NATO and the Warsaw Pact, with Gorbachev commenting, “They say what is NATO without the FRG. (See Document 27) The view of the State Department was that NATO expansion was not on the agenda, because it was not in the interest of the U.S. to organize “an anti-Soviet coalition” that extended to the Soviet borders, not least because it might reverse the positive trends in the Soviet Union. Mitterrand is quite direct, telling Gorbachev that it is too late to fight this issue and that he would not give his support, because “if I say ‘no’ to Germany’s membership in NATO, I will become isolated from my Western partners.” However, Mitterrand suggests that Gorbachev demand “appropriate guarantees” from NATO. Source: Der sowjetische Staats- und Parteichef, Michail Gorbatschow (l.) und Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl unterzeichnen eine gemeinsame Erklärung. Im Ergebnis entstand eine schmale Schicht von Milliardären. Baker reports, “I also used your speech and our recognition of the need to adapt NATO, politically and militarily, and to develop CSCE to reassure Shevardnadze that the process would not yield winners and losers. If NATO takes over Germany, it will look like defeat, one superpower conquering another. Hinzu kommen 123.629 schwere Waffen und sonstiges militärisches Gerät. Das »Zeichnen« genehmer Wahlergebnisse, ein Erbübel aus der Sowjetära, erwies sich als hartnäckige Gewohnheit der bürokratischen Macht: In der Präsidentenadministration wie auch in den Provinzverwaltungen hatte der neue Staatschef große Teile des alten Apparates übernommen und nur leicht mit liberalem Öl geschmiert. Bush (Cornell University Press, 2014), pp. (04.04.2010), Helmut Kohl is considered the architect of German reunification and a driving force behind European integration. November 1989 bis zur Wiedervereinigung am 3. Suite 701, Gelman Library On 13 June 1989, meeting in Bonn, Mikhail Gorbachev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, sign a joint declaration affirming the right of peoples and States to self-determination. In der Geschichtsschreibung des Einigungsprozesses geht dieser 16. 39-61. Baker hoped that Kohl would bring Genscher as well, since always having to inform both the Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry in Bonn was getting tiresome. The George Washington University He talks openly about the shortcomings and problems of perestroika, the need to abolish the leading role of the CPSU, the central government’s mistaken neglect of ethnic issues, the “atrocious” pricing system, and other domestic topics. Common European Home - Wikipedia Mit seiner Politik von Glasnost und Perestroika half er, den Kalten Krieg zu beenden und ermöglichte die deutsche Einheit. Our view is that NATO would continue with a new political role and that we would build on the CSCE process. Bush Presidential Library, NSC Scowcroft Files, FOIA 2009-0275-S. Wolfowitz advises both Havel and Dobrovsky not to enter into such agreements and to remind the Soviets about the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act that postulate freedom to join alliances of their choice. State Department FOIA release, National Security Archive Flashpoints Collection, Box 38. Das neue Russland entstand. Kohl & Gorbatschow, in Strickjacke und Pullover : Reise nach Archyz--wo Kohl und Gorbatschow die Deutsche Einheit schmiedeten. Notes from the first days of the conference are very brief, but they contain one important line that shows that Baker offered the same assurance formula in Ottawa as he did in Moscow: “And if U[nited] G[ermany] stays in NATO, we should take care about nonexpansion of its jurisdiction to the East.” Shevardnadze is not ready to discuss conditions for German unification; he says that he has to consult with Moscow before any condition is approved. These conversations might be called “the education of Vaclav Havel,”[10] as the former dissident-turned-president of Czechoslovakia visited Washington only two months after the Velvet Revolution swept him from prison to the Prague Castle. The best American sources are the Baker Papers at Mudd Library, Princeton, NJ, and the Bush Presidential Library materials, released early via the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard | National Security Archive Juni 1991 vor einem Wahllokal) bei den russischen Präsidentenwahlen, als er vor 30 Jahren gegen die Kommunisten antrat und gewann. Havel said he might have been misunderstood, that he certainly saw the value of U.S. engagement in Europe. Nitze relates that Central and Eastern European leaders attending the “Forum for Germany” conference in Berlin were advocating the dissolution of both the superpower blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, until he (and a few western Europeans) turned around that view and instead emphasized the importance of NATO as the basis of stability and U.S. presence in Europe. Obwohl Kohl und Gorbatschow am Ende gute Beziehungen hatten, eine gewisse Distanz sei geblieben, sagen Experten. Besonders kritisch ist die Lage des Generalsekretärs vor dem 28. Russia's Gorbachev: Hero or failure? - DW - 08/31/2022 That's something of an exaggeration. In the conversation with Havel, Wolfowitz thanks him for his statements about the importance of NATO and US troops in Europe. Der letzte KPdSU-Generalsekretär Michail Gorbatschow erreichte Ende 1990 nur noch . May 25, 2010, Bush and Gorbachev at Malta The meeting took place during Major’s visit to Moscow and right after his one-on-one with President Gorbachev. Kryuchkov, whom Gorbachev appointed to replace Viktor Chebrikov at the KGB in October 1988, comes across here as surprisingly progressive on many issues of domestic reform. 94-95. Shevardnadze expresses concern about the lack of progress on these issues and the U.S. efforts to prevent the EBRD from extending loans to the USSR. Saunafreund Kohls: "Das hat er sich nicht nehmen lassen" Am Freitag ist Kohl im Alter von 87 Jahren gestorben. We had that policy before. Wir verwenden Cookies, um unser Angebot für Sie zu verbessern. In this conversation, Gorbachev is still hoping to persuade his counterpart to join him in opposing German unification in NATO. This memo on the Woerner conversation was written by three prominent reformers and close allies of Yeltsin—Sergey Stepashin (chairman of the Duma’s Security Committee and future deputy minister of Security and prime minister), Gen. Konstantin Kobets (future chief military inspector of Russia after he was the highest-ranking Soviet military officer to support Yeltsin during the August 1991 coup) and Gen. Dmitry Volkogonov (Yeltsin’s adviser on defense and security issues, future head of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW-MIA and prominent military historian). Die Kommunistische Partei war weitgehend diskreditiert. West and East Germany officially united on October 3, 1990. The treaty codified what Bush had earlier offered to Gorbachev – “special military status” for the former GDR territory. Jelzin verstehe offensichtlich die Gesellschaft nicht, in der er lebe, sagte Sinowjew und gab eine düstere Prognose: Die neuen Parteien in der sowjetischen Gesellschaft würden »zur politischen Mafia werden«. Instead, it would produce a new legitimate European structure – one that would be inclusive, not exclusive.” (See Document 17), Baker said it again, directly to Gorbachev on May 18, 1990 in Moscow, giving Gorbachev his “nine points,” which included the transformation of NATO, strengthening European structures, keeping Germany non-nuclear, and taking Soviet security interests into account. Havel remarks to Bush, “It is a question of prestige. [15] The Ungroup overlapped with a similarly ad hoc European Security Strategy Group, and this became the venue, soon after German unification was completed, for the discussion inside the Bush administration about the new NATO role in Europe and especially on NATO relations with countries of Eastern Europe. Now deposited at the Hoover Institution, these excerpts of the Stepanov-Mamaladze notes and diary record Shevardnadze’s disapproval of the speed of the process, but most importantly reinforce the importance of the February 9 and 10 meetings in Moscow, where Western assurances about Soviet security were heard, and Gorbachev’s assent in principle to eventual German unification came as part of the deal. It is simply that the people will force us to stop and to look around.” It is a remarkable admission about domestic political pressures from the last Soviet leader. George H. W. Bush Presidential Library: NSC Philip Zelikow Files, Box CF01468, Folder “File 148 NATO Strategy Review No. Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl ... Am 31. This memcon after Havel’s triumphant speech to Congress contains Bush’s request to Havel to pass the message to Gorbachev that the Americans support him personally, and that “We will not conduct ourselves in the wrong way by saying ‘we win, you lose.’” Emphasizing the point, Bush says, “tell Gorbachev that … I asked you to tell Gorbachev that we will not conduct ourselves regarding Czechoslovakia or any other country in a way that would complicate the problems he has so frankly discussed with me.” The Czechoslovak leader adds his own caution to the Americans about how to proceed with the unification of Germany and address Soviet insecurities. Only a few months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the East voted for a new parliament in what was in effect a referendum on German reunification. Bundeswehr und NVA vereinigen sich am 3. Left to right: Eduard Shevardnadze (USSR), James A. Baker (US), Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FRG), Roland Dumas (France), Douglas Hurd (Great Britain), Oskar Fischer (GDR). Dann beerdigte er die Sowjetunion, gab Oligarchen die Wirtschaft zur Plünderung frei und trank viel zu viel. Wie war es dazu gekommen und welche Spuren blieben? Der Abzug der Sowjetarmee dauert drei Jahre und elf Monate. So stieg Putin verfassungsgemäß zum amtierenden Präsidenten auf und gewann im März 2000 die Wahl. Foto: Georges DeKeerle / Sygma / Getty Images. We intend to discuss all these questions in depth at the leadership level. The two issues were related but not the same. Bush does not contradict this but ties it to the issues of the U.S. presence in Europe and German unification in NATO. Zoellick points out, for example, that Kohl had announced his 10 Points without consulting Washington and after signals from Moscow, and that the U.S. had found out about Kohl going to Moscow from the Soviets, not from Kohl. Photo: Bundesbildstelle / Presseund Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. But if NATO can transform itself – perhaps in conjunction with the Helsinki process – it would look like a peaceful process of change, not defeat.” Bush responded positively: “You raised a good point. Anlass war sein neues Buch "Aus Sorge um Europa". Elbe was Genscher’s chief of staff at the time. This does not sound complementary to the common European home that we have started to build.” Major responded: “I believe that your thoughts about the role of NATO in the current situation are the result of misunderstanding.
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